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a b s t r a c t
The officer of the deck (OOD) of a US Navy ship is in charge of the safe and proper operation of the ship,
and accountable to the commanding officer for every event that occurs during his or her OOD watch. This
paper discusses the development of a prototype behavioral marker system to evaluate, and provide feed-
back on, the nontechnical (cognitive, social, and personal resource) skills of OODs.
An initial set of 17 categories of nontechnical skills were identified from a literature review. A focus
group with four qualified OODs used the skills identified from the literature review to develop an initial
taxonomy of five categories, each with two or three corresponding behavioral elements. This taxonomy
was then used to classify 149 statements concerned with the nontechnical skills of OODs collected from
16 critical incident interviews. After three iterations of adaptations to the taxonomy, two independent
raters were able to reach acceptable levels of reliability in using the taxonomy to classify the statements.
Although further development work is required, it is suggested that the prototype behavioral marker sys-
tem has implications for improving safety and performance on military and civilian ships.
 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The officer of the deck (OOD) is a critical watch station on a US
Navy ship. The OOD is accountable to the Captain for every event
that occurs during his or her OOD watch. ‘‘As the Captain’s direct
representative, the OOD is the only person on board who can make
decisions that affect the safety of the ship and the lives of her crew’’
(Stavridis and Girrier, 2007, p. 3). There are 13 separate watch sta-
tions (individuals in the ship’s company responsible for carrying
out particular tasks) that report directly to the OOD. When under-
way, the OOD is designated by the Captain to be in charge of the
ship including its safe and proper operation (Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, 2005). ‘‘Nowhere in military or civilian life is there a parallel to
the range and degree of responsibility that is placed in the hands of the
OOD. As direct representative of the Captain, he or she acts with all the
authority of command and, next to the Captain and the Executive Offi-
cer (XO), [the OOD] is the most important person on the ship’’ (Stav-
ridis and Girrier, 2007, p. 1).
While technical skills and knowledge are obviously necessary
for an effective OOD, they are not sufficient. The UK Marine Acci-
dent Investigation Branch (MAIB) stated that the majority of mar-
itime accidents are attributed to human error (MAIB, 2000).
Rothblum (2000) states that 75–96% of marine casualties are
caused, at least in part, by human error. Similarly, Wagenaar and
Groeneweg (1987) analyzed 100 Dutch shipping mishaps and
found that in 96 of the mishaps those individuals involved could
have prevented the mishap. In a recent study of mishaps involving
Greek-flagged ships from 1995 to 2006, 57% of mishaps were
attributed to human factors (Kokotos and Linardatos, 2011). Two
examples of US Navy maritime mishaps in the public domain
caused by poor nontechnical skills were the downing of an Iranian
Airliner by the USS Vincennes in July 1988 (Klein, 1998), and the
ramming of an anchored Spanish bulk carrier by the nuclear-pow-
ered aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower in August 1988 (Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board, NTSB, 1990). It was determined
that the probable causes of the ramming of the Spanish vessel were
the delayed and insufficient action to correct the USS Eisenhower’s
deviation from the intended track by the navigator and the OOD.
The OOD did not adequately track the vessels movement (failure
of situation awareness), and the commanding officer (CO) was
not informed of a change of speed in a timely manner (failure of
communication; NTSB, 1990).
Nontechnical skills are the ‘‘cognitive, social, and personal re-
source skills that complement technical skills, and contribute to safe
and efficient task performance’’ (Flin et al., 2008, p. 1). Stavridis
and Girrier (2007) state that the nontechnical skills of forehanded-
ness, vigilance, judgment, intuition, and leadership are just as
important to OODs as technical skills and knowledge. However, de-
spite the recognized importance of nontechnical skills, there has
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not been any research conducted to identify the specific nontech-
nical skills required by the OOD. There are also no valid and reli-
able tools to evaluate and provide feedback on the nontechnical
skills of OODs. The lack of a framework for evaluating nontechnical
skills is not confined to the OOD watch station. There has been lit-
tle human factors research conducted in the maritime industry
more generally (Hetherington et al., 2006). The purpose of this pa-
per is to carry out a task analysis to identify the nontechnical skills
required by effective OODs, and develop a prototype behavioral
marker system for evaluating these skills.
2. Behavioral markers
Behavioral markers are ‘‘observable, nontechnical behaviors that
contribute to superior or substandard performance within a work
environment’’ (Klampfer et al., 2001, p. 10). They are usually struc-
tured into a set of categories (e.g. co-operation, decision making,
and situational awareness). Normally, these categories are then
sub-divided into more specific nontechnical skills or elements.
The seminal research on behavioral markers comes from studies
of civilian pilots carried out by Helmreich and colleagues at the
University of Texas. In the late 1980s they developed a data collec-
tion form called the LINE/LOS Checklist (LLC) to gather information
on flight crews’ crew resource management performance (Helmr-
eich et al., 1990). This checklist has been used as the basis of many
airlines’ behavioral marker systems (Flin and Martin, 2001).
Another example of behavioral marker system that is widely
used in civil aviation is Nontechnical Skills (NOTECHS). It consists
of four categories (co-operation, leadership and management
skills, situation awareness, and decision making), with 15 associ-
ated elements (for example, the elements in the co-operation cat-
egory are ‘team building and maintaining’, ‘considering others’,
‘supporting others’, and ‘conflict solving’. Ratings from 1 (very
poor) to 5 (very good) are given to the pilot and co-pilot on each
element. The NOTECHS systemwas found to have acceptable levels
of reliability when used by trained raters to evaluate the nontech-
nical skills of civilian pilots (Flin et al., 2008). Behavioral marker
systems have also been developed for using by anesthesiologists
(Anaesthetists’ nontechnical skills, ANTS; Fletcher et al., 2004), sur-
geons (Nontechnical skills for surgeons, NOTSS; Yule et al., 2006),
scrub nurses (scrub practitioners’ list of intra-operative non techni-
cal skills, SPLINTS; Mitchell and Flin, 2009), and nuclear power
control room teams (O’Connor et al., 2008).
Klampfer et al. (2001) identified five characteristics of a good
behavioral marker: it should describe a specific and observable
behavior instead of an attitude or personality trait; while it does
not have to be present in every situation, the behavioral marker
should have a causal relationship with the performance outcome;
it needs to be described in domain specific language; it should em-
ploy simple phraseology; and it should describe a clear concept.
Flin et al. (2008) also identified three significant limitations to
behavioral marker systems. First, they are never capable of captur-
ing every possible aspect of performance. The variables that effect
performance are simply too wide ranging to rate with one system.
The second limitation is that it may not be possible to observe
some behaviors. Important, but infrequent, capabilities such as
conflict management may not occur often enough to rate on a con-
sistent basis. The final limitation is the abilities of human observ-
ers. While human raters bring experience and skills that a fully
automatic assessor cannot match, they also bring their own biases
and perceptions.
2.1. Developing a behavioral marker system
The typical method for the initial development of behavioral
marker systems is to carry out a literature review of previous
domain specific research concerned with nontechnical skills, fol-
lowed by interviews with subject matter experts designed to ex-
tract the nontechnical skills required to do their job effectively
(e.g. Fletcher et al., 2004; Mitchell and Flin, 2009; Yule et al., 2006).
It might be expected that useful information could be obtained
from accident and incident reports. However, a number of authors
have commented that these types of reports contain little in the
way of human factors information (e.g. Fletcher et al., 2004; O’Con-
nor et al., 2008; Yule et al., 2008). This is also true of reports of US
Navy surface warfare mishaps and incidents. Carter-Trahan (2009)
found that in an examination of 111 major mishaps in the surface
warfare community investigated by the Naval Safety Center from
1999 to 2009, only 23% of mishaps were attributed to human fac-
tors (the remaining were attributed to material causes, 12%; and
unknown causes, 65%). The percentage of mishaps attributed to
human factors in the surface warfare community is far below the
80% that are generally attributed to human error in other organiza-
tions, including US Naval aviation (Hollnagel, 1993; Reason, 1990;
Wiegmann and Shappell, 1999).
Based upon a review of the processes used to develop behav-
ioral marker systems in other domains, it was decided to use a
three stage methodology consisting of a literature review, focus
group interview, and critical incident interviews to develop a pro-
totype behavioral marker system for OODs. Each of these stages is
described in detail below.
3. Literature review
The purpose of the literature review was to create an exhaustive
list of nontechnical skills that have been shown to be necessary for
effective performance in high risk domains, with a particular focus
on any research that had been carried out in the maritime industry.
Several electronic databases (PsychINFO, ScienceDirect, Web of
Science, Google Scholar, and the Defence Technical Information
Center) were used to identify research articles on human factors
in the maritime industry by using the following search terms: mar-
itime, shipping, behavioral markers, human factors, situation
awareness, decision making, communication, leadership, team-
work, safety, and shipping/maritime accidents.
An examination of the literature on nontechnical skills in the
maritime industry found that little previous research had been car-
ried out in this domain. Similar conclusions were drawn by Hethe-
rington et al. (2006). In their review of human factors studies
carried out in the maritime industry only 20 relevant articles were
found. Schröder-Hinrichs (2010) also stated that it was noticeable
that recently human factors had not been high on the international
maritime agenda.
The only reference to behavioral markers in the maritime indus-
try was by Gatfield (2005). He used simulator observations to de-
velop a set of markers for assessing the competencies of
merchant marine engineering officers during crisis management.
However, the behavioral markers were not developed at the time
of publication (nor are they discussed in any subsequent
publications).
Given the dearth of research on nontechnical skills in the mar-
itime industry, four behavioral marker systems that were available
in the literature (LLC, NOTECHS, ANTS, and NOTSS) were examined.
Also included were the nontechnical skills identified by Stavridis
and Girrier (2007), the skills identified by Flin et al. (2008), and
the relevant personnel issues identified by Hetherington et al.
(2006). This literature review resulted in the identification of 17
categories of nontechnical skills. These are shown in Table 1. The
purpose of identifying these categories of nontechnical skills was
to develop a ‘‘start list’’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994) of domains
derived from the literature, which would then be modified as
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necessary in subsequent stages of the development of the behav-
ioral marker system.
From Table 1 it can be seen that several of the skills were over-
lapping, lacked specificity, and may be unrelated to the OOD watch
station. In the next stage of the study the list of nontechnical skills
obtained from the literature was refined with input from subject
matter experts (SMEs).
4. Focus group
A group of SMEs identified which of the nontechnical skills in
Table 1 were appropriate for assessing OODs. Once this had been
carried out, the goal was for the SMEs to then agree upon an initial
taxonomy of skills sub-divided into specific elements (the same
structure as NOTECHS).
4.1. Focus group participants
The focus group consisted of four US Navy junior officers led by
an experienced OOD. Each participant was a Surface Warfare Offi-
cer (SWO) attending the Naval Postgraduate School. All of the par-
ticipants had been qualified as an OOD for a minimum of a year.
They had all stood the watch numerous times and spent time train-
ing others to do the same. They were also all Human Systems Inte-
gration Masters’ students, and had received education in human
factors, safety, individual differences, leadership, and team work-
ing. The rationale for choosing these particular participants was
that they had all just completed a tour in which they stood the
OOD watch on a US Navy surface ship. Therefore, they had recent
experience of being an OOD to draw upon. Secondly, in addition
to their operational expertise, their education in human factors
aided them in considering the nontechnical skill required by the
OOD from a more academic/theoretical perspective.
4.2. Focus group procedure
Prior to the focus group each participant was provided the list of
nontechnical skills shown in Table 1, a definition of each skill, and
examples of behavioral marker systems (NOTECHS and LLC). They
were asked to familiarize themselves with the material prior to
meeting. It was explained that the goal of the focus group was to
identify which of the skills in Table 1 were applicable to the OOD
watch station, and would make an effective behavioral marker.
The group began by eliminating nontechnical skills that they
felt were either redundant or not applicable to the position of
the OOD. For example, the participants removed ‘judgment’ be-
cause they felt it was included under the ‘decision making’ cate-
gory. ‘Co-operation’ was eliminated because the focus group felt
that is was not applicable since the study was addressing individ-
ual instead of team skills. The participants removed other skills
such as ‘forehandedness’ and ‘energy’ as it was decided that the
meanings were too ambiguous.
Once the focus group had identified a list of nontechnical skills,
they were asked to use these to formulate a taxonomy of categories
and associated elements. The participants were encouraged to
draw from their experience as an OOD, and their human factors
education, to identify specific behavioral markers skills. Following
the discussion, the group reached a consensus on five categories,
each with two or three corresponding elements. The taxonomy
that resulted from the focus group is shown in Table 2.
5. Critical incident interviews
The purpose of this stage of the research was to evaluate
whether the taxonomy developed by the focus group (shown in Ta-
ble 2) could be used to reliably classify the nontechnical skills used
by OODs in actual scenarios. It was anticipated that this process
would be iterative, and the raters would need to make changed
to the taxonomy in order to achieve acceptable reliability. The sce-
narios were developed using the critical incident technique (CIT) to
generate interview data for analysis. The data was then analyzed
using an adaption of the consensual qualitative methodology (Hill
et al., 1997, 2005). The combination of these two techniques was
used by O’Connor et al. (2007) to identify the causal factors of US
Navy diving mishaps, and by O’Connor et al. (2008) to identify
the team skills require by nuclear operations personnel.
5.1. Interview sample
A total of eight US Naval junior officers were interviewed. The
participants were all qualified OODs and had spent a minimum
of a year standing the watch on a US Navy ship. Each of the eight
participants related between one and three challenging situations
they had experienced while standing watch as an OOD. A total of
16 separate scenarios were collected. The interviews lasted be-
tween 25 and 60 min with an average of 45 min.
5.2. Interview procedure
The CIT interview is a task analysis method used for evaluating
behavior in work environments. CIT has been widely used in stud-
ies of human error and safety (Kirwan and Ainsworth, 1992). It en-
ables the researcher to identify the (often tacit) knowledge of skills
and expertise possessed by respondents by asking them to describe
a challenging incident. It goes beyond procedural knowledge by
probing the behavioral aspects of experience (O’Connor et al.,
2008). The CIT interviews were conducted in four sweeps by a
qualified OOD knowledgeable about human factors.
Sweep 1 – Prompting the interviewee to identify a relevant inci-
dent: Each participant was asked to select and describe an event
Table 1
Initial list of nontechnical skills.
 Situational awareness
 Decision making
 Communication
 Team working
 Leadership
 Managing stress
 Coping with fatigue
 Forehandedness
 Vigilance
 Judgment
 Intuition/experience
 Energy
 Co-operation
 Management skills
 Task management
 Workload management
 Assertiveness
Table 2
Initial OOD nontechnical skills taxonomy.
Category Element
Leadership Establishing authority
Managing workload
Maintaining the standards of the watch
Decision making Defining the problem
Generating possible solutions
Implementing best solution
Situational awareness Actively gathering information
Responding to changes in information
Anticipating future events
Communication Selecting correct medium
Sending information clearly and concisely
Effectively receiving information
Managing stress Maintaining concentration
Coping with stressors
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that occurred when they were standing watch as the OOD
which they found to be particularly challenging. They were
asked to describe the event from their own perspective and to
provide details, stage by stage as it developed.
Sweep 2 – Filling in gaps in the incident: The interviewer
repeated the reported incident back to the respondent, in order
to check understanding. The respondent was told they should
correct any mistakes in the account or add any information that
was omitted during the recounting. This sweep helps to pin-
point gaps, both in time and events, and typically aids in recall
of the missing portions.
Sweep 3 – Expanding on the incident to look for cues and fac-
tors affecting teamwork: The interviewer went through the
event again, this time probing at various points and asking for
more detailed description of the nontechnical aspects of the sit-
uation. This sweep involved questioning the reasoning process
and looking for cues and rationale for the actions taken by team
members.
Sweep 4 – ‘‘What if’’ queries: The interviewer asks questions
about the participant’s perceptions, thoughts, judgments, and
actions, and what would have happened if aspects of the sce-
nario had been different. Each question is designed to extract
more information that is applicable and gain a better under-
standing of the story as a whole.
Interview transcription. Rather than transcribe the whole inter-
view, the recording was used to develop a single full report of the
incident. The events were put into chronological order and repeti-
tions omitted. The interviews were ‘edited’ into a standard format
that was concise, clear and comparable across the 16 interviews. A
total of 149 statements concerned with the nontechnical skills of
the OOD were identified from the interview transcripts.
These statements were selected based upon the opinions of two
US Naval officers who read through the interviews together, and
unanimously decided whether or not a statement was concerned
with the behavior of the OOD. One of the coder was a qualified
OOD and a Human Systems Integration Masters student at the Na-
val Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. The other coder had
a Ph.D in psychology with a background in human factors and the
coding of interview transcripts. Statements concerned with atti-
tudes (e.g., ‘‘the commanding officer was difficult to work for’’),
knowledge about the team (e.g., ‘‘everyone did not carry out the
task in exactly the same way’’), or technical knowledge or informa-
tion (e.g., ‘‘the sailing boat was heading on a bearing of 300’’) were
not selected.
5.3. Categorization of statements
The same two coders that identified the statements from the
interview transcripts also independently categorized the state-
ments identified from the interviews for each of the three itera-
tions of categorization.
Iteration 1. A total of 25 randomly selected statements were
independently categorized by the raters using the taxonomy devel-
oped by the focus group (see Table 2). Cohen’s kappa was used to
calculate the inter-rater reliability between the raters. An inter-
rater reliability of j = 0.43 resulted (moderate agreement; Landis
and Koch, 1977). From the complete lack of agreement between
the raters for the statements categorized by at least one of the rat-
ers using one of the ‘leadership’ or ‘managing stress’ it was con-
cluded that these elements were too ambiguous and required
clarification. There was also a lack of acceptable levels of agree-
ment as to when to utilize the ‘decision making’ or ‘communica-
tion’ categories.
The two coders discussed the areas of agreement and disagree-
ment, and were also sensitive to the need to ensure that system
was as parsimonious as possible, with the minimal overlap be-
tween elements (Klampfer et al., 2001). On the basis of the discus-
sion, the following changes to the taxonomy in an attempt to
improve the inter-rater reliability.
 The ‘managing stress’ category was removed, and added as an
element in the leadership category. The rationale was that
‘maintaining concentration’ was not a skill that could be readily
observed. Also, it was decided that the ability to manage stress
in oneself, and other team members, is a leadership skill.
 The leadership elements ‘establishing authority’ and ‘maintain-
ing the standards of the watch’ were removed. It was decided
that these two elements did not need to be specifically delin-
eated, as they overlap with other elements such as ‘managing
workload’, ‘managing stress’, and ‘following orders and
procedures.’
 The elements of the decision making category were changed to
‘considering options’, ‘balancing risks’, and ‘implementing and
reviewing decisions.’ This terminology is closer to the decision
making training that is taught to all US Naval personnel as part
of Operational Risk Management (see Bellenkes, 2010 for more
details).
 The elements of the communication category were changed to
‘issuing orders’, ‘following orders and procedures’, and ‘provid-
ing information.’ It was clear from the interview transcripts that
issuing orders, providing information, and responding to direct
orders are key skills of the OOD that were not addressed in the
initial OOD nontechnical skills taxonomy. It was also concluded
that ‘effectively receiving information’ was more a function of
the watch stander providing the information to the OOD, and
‘selecting the correct medium’ was largely redundant.
Iteration 2. A random set of 25 statements (that were not coded
in the first iteration) were independently analyzed using the re-
vised taxonomy. An inter-rater reliability of j = 0.65 resulted (sub-
stantial agreement; Landis and Koch, 1977). There was perfect
agreement for the elements in the ‘leadership’ category, and there
was acceptable agreement for the ‘communication’ elements.
Unfortunately, there was still disagreement between the raters
for the ‘decision making’ and ‘situational awareness’ elements.
After a discussion, the raters decided that more broadly defined
‘decision making’ elements would likely improve the inter-rater
reliability. It was decided to use the three naturalistic decision
making styles (analytical, rule-based, and intuitive; Klein, 2008)
as the basis of the decision making elements. However, rule-based
decision making was changed to ‘following orders and procedures’
to better fit the OOD environment. Since this element had previ-
ously been an element under communication, it was removed from
the communication category, and replaced with ‘receiving
information’.
Iteration 3. The raters took 25 previously un-coded statements
and tested the reliability of the second revision to the taxonomy.
An inter-rater reliability of j = 0.70 (substantial agreement) re-
sulted. The raters were able to agree on the use of the ‘leadership’
and ‘decision making’ elements. However, there was some confu-
sion between the elements from the ‘communication’ category
and elements from the ‘situational awareness’ category. Specifi-
cally, it was difficult to decide whether the OOD was ‘gathering
information’ or ‘receiving information’. In the example of a lookout
making a report, the OOD was certainly receiving information, but
was also improving his/her situational awareness. To address this
problem it was decided to eliminate the ‘receiving information’
element from the ‘communication’ category. The author also re-
worded two of the situational awareness elements to provide fur-
ther clarification. ‘Actively gathering information’ was changed to
‘gathering awareness’, and ‘responding to changes in information’
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was changed to ‘understanding awareness’ (the taxonomy is
shown in Table 3).
All 149 statements were then independently classified by the
raters, and a kappa of 0.91 resulted. As the level of inter-rater reli-
ability was higher than a kappa of 0.8 (perfect agreement as de-
fined by Landis and Koch, 1977), no further changes were made
to the taxonomy. Table 3 shows the distribution of the statements
across the skills and elements. For the nine statements for which
the raters did not agree, the ratings of the coder who was a quali-
fied OOD were used as he had a better understanding of the oper-
ational environment.
6. Discussion
The prototype Nontechnical Skills for Officers of the Deck
(NTSOD) taxonomy, shown in Table 3, provides a structure for
evaluating the nontechnical skills of OODs. However, further devel-
opmental work is required to ensure that the system can be reli-
ably used by evaluators. Once a prototype behavioral marker
system has been developed, the next stage is to get the anticipated
end users to rate standardized video enactments of scenarios sim-
ilar to those encountered in the actual environment (Fletcher et al.,
2004; O’Connor et al., 2002; Yule et al., 2008). The purpose of this
evaluation is to assess the sensitivity, inter-rater reliability, and
internal reliability of the system. The scenarios are typically filmed
in a simulator with subject matter experts acting the main roles.
Should an acceptable level of reliability and sensitivity be
achieved, the usability of the behavioral marker system is then
examined by using it to evaluate the behaviors of trainees in the
actual environment (i.e. flight deck, operating theater, ship’s
bridge, etc.). Completed rating forms are examined to assess
whether all the elements and categories are being used, and infor-
mation is obtained from the raters on the usability of the behav-
ioral marker system.
The NTSOD taxonomy not only has implications for the evalua-
tion of the nontechnical skills of OODs, but could also be used to
provide a research foundation for the content of the US Navy’s
bridge resource management (BRM) program. As stated by Hethe-
rington et al. (2006) ‘‘a review of the literature reveals that there ap-
pears to be no empirical foundation for this type of course beyond
research that was originally conducted in the formation of aviation
CRM [crew resource management] courses’’ (p. 407). The US Navy’s
BRM program is no exception. O’Connor (in press) compared the
attitudes towards, and knowledge of, the human factors that are
causal to mishaps of two groups of US Naval officers – SurfaceWar-
fare Officers (SWOs, those officers that serve aboard ships) and avi-
ators. It was found that Navy’s BRM training did not have a
significant effect on the attitudes and knowledge of SWOs. More-
over, naval aviators were significantly more knowledgeable, and
generally held attitudes that were significantly more positive than
SWOs who had attended BRM training and those that had not.
O’Connor (in press) concluded that there was a need for a system-
atic research effort to identify the particular human factors issues
that should be included as part of the Navy’s BRM program.
The first stage in the development of any training program
should be a needs assessment. In the context of nontechnical skills
training, such as BRM/CRM, a training needs assessment is neces-
sary to identify the skills to be trained (Flin et al., 2008). To illus-
trate, extensive background research was carried out to identify
the seven skills that form the basis of US Naval aviation CRM train-
ing (decision making, assertiveness, mission analysis, communica-
tion, leadership, adaptability/flexibility, and situational awareness;
Prince and Salas, 1993). The needs assessment ensured that the
training was based upon a sound research foundation, and that
limited time and resources for training were being effectively
utilized.
Examining the NTSOD skills and elements that were most
commonly used to categorize the interview statements provides
Table 3
Prototype nontechnical skills for officers of the deck (NTSOD) taxonomy with percentages of classifications attributed to each skill and element.
Skill Element Definition Example Skill
%
Element
% within
skill
Overall
element
%
Leadership Managing
watch team
Effectively setting and maintaining the
standards of the watch team
The OOD utilized the dead time in the schedule to
review the emergency procedures with the helmsman
12.1 44.4 5.4
Coping with
stress
Retaining a calm demeanor when under
pressure and demonstrating to the watch
that one is under control
Despite the added pressure from the XO, the OOD
managed the stress and performed proficiently
55.6 6.7
Communication Providing
information
Passing information along to other watch
stations throughout the ship, as well as other
assets in the area
The OOD called the other ships in formation to inform
them that the passing oiler was dimly lit and difficult to
see
28.2 33.3 9.4
Issuing orders Effectively giving orders to other members of
the watch team and other individuals as
required
The OOD ordered the Engineering Officer of the Watch
to start another engine
66.7 18.8
Situational
awareness
Gathering
awareness
Actively gathering information to keep up
with the changing situation
At two nautical miles out, the OOD visually inspected
the contact through binoculars
39.6 66.1 26.2
Understanding
awareness
Achieving an understanding of what the
available information means
The OOD identified the contact as a fishing vessel by
analyzing the lighting configuration
25.4 10.1
Anticipating
future events
Forward planning in order to anticipate
possible future problems
The OOD had the Conning Officer drive slightly right of
the intended track because he knew the wind and
current would push the ship to the left
8.5 3.4
Decision
making
Analytical
decision
making
Generating and comparing multiple courses
of actions to come up with the optimal
solution
Once the oiler was located, the OOD decided to start
driving towards her early to ensure that there was
plenty of time to set up later
20.1 53.3 10.7
Following
orders &
procedures
Following documented procedures or direct
orders from superior officers
The OOD used the wind envelope guide to make sure
that the winds were sufficient to conduct flight
operations
40.0 8.1
Intuitive
decision
making
Making quick decisions based upon prior
experience and intuition
When the mysterious light finally materialized as a
sailboat 300 yards off the port bow, the OOD
immediately ordered ‘‘Hard Right Rudder.’’
6.7 1.3
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evidence as to the nontechnical skills that should be emphasized
during OOD and BRM training. From Table 3 it can be seen that
the most frequently used elements were ‘issuing orders’ and ‘gath-
ering information’. These two elements were used to categorize al-
most half of the interview statements. Therefore, assertiveness and
the giving of direct and explicit orders would appear to be an
important nontechnical skill that should be emphasized in the
training of junior OODs. This finding is not unexpected given that
the OOD is the leader of the bridge team, and must provide direc-
tion to the 13 different watch stations that report to him or her.
Gathering information was the most commonly used NTSOD
element in this study – it was used to classify 26.2% of the inter-
view statements. The failure of US Navy sailors to gather informa-
tion was a key causal factor in the ramming of the Spanish freighter
by the USS Eisenhower (NTSB, 1990). In Endsley’s (1995) three stage
model of situational awareness, the first stage of gathering infor-
mation is where most errors occur. Jones and Endsley (1996)
examined situational awareness errors in civil aviation, and Sned-
don et al. (2006) examined them in offshore oil drilling. It was
found that the most situational awareness errors occurred while
gather information (76.3% and 67.0% respectively), as opposed to
understanding the meaning of the information (20.3% and 20.0%
of errors respectively), or anticipating future states (3.4% and
13.0% of errors respectively). Therefore, given the importance to
the OOD of the skill of gathering information, in combination with
it being where most errors occur, the OOD must be given training
that emphasizes and provides practice in effectively gathering
information (e.g. maintaining a good scan; see Flin et al., 2008,
for more details).
Intuitive decision making was rarely used to classify the inter-
view statements (it was only used to classify 1.3% of the state-
ments). Part of the explanation for this may be that the
operations of a US Navy ship are highly proceduralized. However,
although it may be rare, the ability to make intuitive decisions is
crucial for the OOD in risky fast moving non-normal situations
for which there is no procedure.
7. Conclusion
Hetherington et al. (2006) stated that there are many gaps in
the maritime human factors literature. We believe that the NTSOD
taxonomy is a step towards filling these gaps. Although further re-
search is required to establish the reliability and validity of the
NTSOD taxonomy, it is one of the first research based behavioral
markers systems developed for use in a maritime environment. It
is suggested that the NTSOD taxonomy has implications for the
teaching and evaluation of nontechnical skills beyond the OOD.
Other military and civilian ships have individuals who stand a
watch similar in scope to the US Navy OOD. Therefore, the NTSOD
taxonomy provides a useful starting point to identify the nontech-
nical skills required by other watch standers on the bridge of mil-
itary and civilian ships.
Human error can never be eliminated. However, identifying,
training, and giving feedback on the nontechnical skills that are re-
quired for safe and effective performance will ensure that civilian
and military sailors have the appropriate skills for minimizing,
catching, and mitigating error before it leads to an mishap.
Acknowledgment
All opinions stated in this paper are those of the authors and do
not necessarily represent the opinion or position of the US Navy,
the Naval Postgraduate School, or the National University of Ire-
land, Galway.
References
Bellenkes, A., 2010. Military aviation safety policy and managing the culture of risk.
In: O’Connor, P., Cohn, J. (Eds.), Human Performance Enhancements in High-Risk
Environments: Insights Developments, and Future Directions from Military
Research. ABC-Clio, Santa Barbara, CA, pp. 150–168.
Carter-Trahan, A., 2009. An Examination of the Human Factors Attitudes and
Knowledge of Surface Warfare Officers. Masters Thesis. Naval Postgraduate
School, Monterey, CA.
Chief of Naval Operations, 2005. Standard Organization and Regulations of the US
Navy. OPNAVINST 3120.32C Washington, DC: Author.
Endsley, M., 1995. Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems.
Human Factors 37, 32–64.
Fletcher, G., Flin, R., McGeorge, P., Glavin, R., Maran, N., Patey, R., 2004. Rating
nontechnical skills: developing a behavioral marker system for use in
anaesthesia. Cognition, Technology, and Work 6, 165–171.
Flin, R., Martin, L., 2001. Behavioral markers for CRM: a review of current practice.
International Journal of Aviation Psychology 11, 95–118.
Flin, R., O’Connor, P., Crichton, M., 2008. Safety at the Sharp End: Training
Nontechnical Skills. Ashgate Publishing Ltd., Aldershot, England.
Gatfield, D., 2005. Using simulation to determine a framework for the objective
assessment of competence in maritime crisis management. Paper Presented at
the Society for the Advancement of Games and Simulations in Education and
Training Annual Conference, Portsmouth, England.
Helmreich, R., Wilhelm, J., Kello, J., Taggart, E., Butler, R., 1990. Reinforcing and
Evaluating Crew Resource Management: Evaluator/LOS Instructor Manual.
Austin: NASA/UT/FAA Aerospace Group.
Hetherington, C., Flin, R., Mearns, K., 2006. Safety in shipping: the human elements.
Journal of Safety Research 37, 401–411.
Hill, C.E., Knox, S., Thompson, B.J., Williams, E.N., Hess, S.A., Landany, N., 2005.
Consensual qualitative research: an update. Journal of Counselling Psychology
52 (2), 196–205.
Hill, C.E., Thompson, B.J., Williams, E.N., 1997. A guide to conducting consensual
qualitative research. The Counseling Psychologist 25, 207–217.
Hollnagel, E., 1993. Human Reliability Analysis: Context and Control. Harcourt
Brace, London, UK.
Jones, D., Endsley, M., 1996. Sources of situation awareness errors in aviation.
Aviation Space, and Environmental Medicine 67, 507–512.
Kirwan, B., Ainsworth, L.K., 1992. A Guide to Task Analysis. Taylor & Francis,
London.
Klampfer, B., Flin, R., Helmreich, R., Häusler, R., Sexton, B., Fletcher, G., Field, P.,
Staender, S., Lauche, K., Dieckmann, P., Amacher, A., 2001. Enhancing
Performance in High Risk Environments: Recommendations for the use of
Behavioral Markers. Report from the Behavioral Markers Workshop, Zürich,
June. Berlin: Damler Benz Foundation.
Klein, G., 2008. Naturalistic decision making. Human Factors 50, 456–460.
Klein, G., 1998. Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions. MIT Press,
Cambridge.
Kokotos, D.X., Linardatos, D.S., 2011. An application of data mining tools for the
study of shipping safety in restricted waters. Safety Science 49, 192–197.
Landis, J.R., Koch, G.G., 1977. The measurement of observer agreement for
categorical data. Biometrics 33 (1), 159–174.
MAIB, 2000. Annual Report 1999. Department of the Environment Transport and
Regions, London.
Miles, M.B., Huberman, A.M., 1994. Qualitative Data Analysis. Sage, Thousand Oaks,
CA.
Mitchell, L., Flin, R., 2009. Scrub practitioners’ list of intra-operative nontechnical
skills-SPLINTS. In: Flin, R., Mitchell, L. (Eds.), Safer Surgery. Ashgate Publishing
Ltd., Aldershot, England, pp. 67–82.
National Transportation Safety Board, 1990. Ramming of the Spanish Bulk Carrier
Urduliz by the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69). National Transportation
Safety Board, Washington, DC.
O’Connor, P., in press. An evaluation of the effectiveness of bridge resource
management training. International Journal of Aviation Psychology.
O’Connor, P., Hörmann, H.-J., Flin, R., Lodge, M., Goeters, K.M.the JARTEL group.,
2002. Developing a method for evaluating CRM skills: a European perspective.
International Journal of Aviation Psychology 12 (3), 263–286.
O’Connor, P., O’Dea, A., Flin, R., 2008. Identifying the team skills required by nuclear
operations personnel. International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics 38, 1028–
1037.
O’Connor, P., O’Dea, A., Melton, J., 2007. A methodology for identifying human error
in US Navy diving accidents. Human Factors 49 (2), 214–226.
Prince, C., Salas, E., 1993. Training and research for teamwork in the military
aircrew. In: Wiener, E., Kanki, B., Helmreich, R. (Eds.), Cockpit Resource
Management. Academic Press, San Diego, pp. 337–366.
Reason, J., 1990. Human Error. Cambridge University Press, New York.
Rothblum, A.R., 2000. Human error and marine safety. Paper presented at the
National Safety Council Congress and Expo, Orlando, FL.
Schröder-Hinrichs, J.-U., 2010. Human and organizational factors in the maritime
world – are we keeping up to speed? WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs 9 (1), 1–
3.
Sneddon, A., Mearns, K., Flin, R., 2006. Situation awareness and safety in offshore
drill crews. Cognition, Technology, and Work 8, 255–267.
Stavridis, J., Girrier, R., 2007. Watch Officer’s Guide. Naval Institute Press, Annapolis,
MD.
1386 P. O’Connor, W. Max Long / Safety Science 49 (2011) 1381–1387
Wagenaar, W.A., Groeneweg, J., 1987. Accidents at sea: multiple causes and
impossible consequences. International Journal of Man–Machine Studies 27,
587–598.
Wiegmann, D.A., Shappell, S.A., 1999. Human error and crew resource management
failures in Naval safety center data, 1990–1996. Aviation, Space and
Environmental Medicine 70, 1147–1151.
Yule, S., Flin, R., Maran, N., Rowley, D., Youngson, G.G., Paterson-Brown, S., 2008.
Surgeons’ nontechnical skills in the operating room: reliability testing of the
NOTSS behaviour rating system. World Journal of Surgery 32, 548–556.
Yule, S., Flin, R., Paterson-Brown, S., Maran, N., Rowley, D., 2006. Development of a
rating system for surgeons’ nontechnical skills. Medical Education 50, 1098–
1104.
P. O’Connor, W. Max Long / Safety Science 49 (2011) 1381–1387 1387
